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WIGSTOCK AND THE KULTURKAMPF:
SUPREME COURT STORYTELLING,
THE CULTURE WAR, AND ROMER v. EVANS
Richard F. Duncan*
Argument is insufficient; America needs exorcism.
-Peter Kreeft'
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society is deeply divided over the meaning of good and evil.
We tell clashing stories about things that matter a great deal, things
such as abortion, marriage and family, education, the role of religion
in the public square, and the ethics of human sexuality.2 James
Davison Hunter observed that this culture war is a struggle between
starkly polarized moral communities and that it represents "a strain
upon the course of democratic practice."3 Indeed, I often think
America was a good idea that, sadly, has failed. Perhaps there is too
much pluribus for there to be unum.
Certainly one might well reach that conclusion after reading the
majority and dissenting opinions in Romer v. Evans,4 the recent
* Sherman S. Welpton, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law (rduncan@unlinfo.unl.edu). I wish to thank Tim Tymkovich, Chuck Cooper,
Bob Bork, Kelly Duncan, GaryYoung, and the members of the ReligionLaw list on the
internet. I should disclose that I co-authored an amicus brief in support of the
constitutionality of Amendment 2 in Romer. This Article is dedicated to my daughter,
Rebeccajoy Duncan. May you, my little one, "become the mother of thousands of ten
thousands; and may your descendants possess the gates of those who hate them."
Genesis 24:60.
1 P=R KREErr, EcuMENIcALJIHAD 17 (1996).
2 See generallyJAMEs DAVIsON HUNTER, CULTURM WARS: Tim STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AmsiucA (1991).
3 Id. at 316.
4 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The case generated two separate opinions below by the
Colorado Supreme Court. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (en banc);
Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
Duncan in Notre Dame Law Review (1997) 72. Copyright 1997, University of Notre Dame. Used by permission.
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Supreme Court decision that invalidated Colorado Amendment 25
under the Equal Protection Clause. The opinions in Romer, although
nearly devoid of rigorous legal analysis, are nevertheless compelling as
narratives of the culture war.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze both the doctrine and
the stories of Romer. At the end of the day, I hope to demonstrate that
although Romer makes an insignificant contribution to the develop-
ment of constitutional law, it does much to limn the nature of the
Kulturkampf that threatens to irrevocably destroy our national unity.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ROMER
If the only tool you own is a hammer, every problem looks like a
nail.6 Justice Kennedy apparently thinks the people of Colorado used
a hammer-Amendment 2-when a more precise instrument was
called for.
Indeed, Amendment 2 is a blunt device. Even many of us who
defended its constitutionality were uncomfortable with its breadth.
The Amendment singled out a class of persons-homosexuals and
bisexuals-and amended the state constitution to forbid all levels of
state and local government from adopting any statute, ordinance, or
policy designed to protect this group against discrimination. The
Amendment's breadth made it possible to imagine cases in which it
would bar policies designed to protect homosexuals from harms that
all would acknowledge to be wrongful.
For example, suppose there was good reason to believe that cer-
tain members of the police force would refuse to protect homosexuals
from violent criminal attacks. 7 And suppose further that the police
5 If allowed to go into effect, Amendment 2 would have been CoLo. CONST. art.
II, § 30b:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orienta-
tion. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or depart-
ments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, prac-
tices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle
any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
6 I believe this proverb is an old one, but I most recently encountered it in an
article by Frederick Schauer. Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions
and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989, 1004 (1995).
7 Say, for example, a local newspaper had published a story about a rash of as-
saults on homosexuals in public parks, and undisclosed members of the police force
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department, wishing to reassure the gay community that it would be
served equally, adopted a policy stating that "the services of the police
department are available to all without regard to race, gender, reli-
gion or sexual orientation." This policy, which no one could seriously
object to, would have violated the Colorado state constitution if
Amendment 2 had been allowed to go into effect.8
Of course, the people of Colorado were not seeking to deny po-
lice protection to gays and lesbians when they ratified Amendment 2.
Rather, they were primarily concerned about protecting the liberty
and associational rights of employers and landlords against restrictive
"gay rights" ordinances enacted in Colorado's more progressive mu-
nicipalities.9 But the broad language of the Amendment swept well
beyond this reasonable terrain and literally prohibited all attempts by
all levels of government to protect individuals against discrimination
on the basis of homosexual "orientation, conduct, practices or rela-
tionships."' 0 As Justice Kennedy observed, under the Amendment
homosexuals could "obtain specific protection against discrimination
only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state
constitution.""
If one searches for sophisticated legal reasoning in the Court's
decision in Romer he will be disappointed, because "there is no there
there."' 2 Although media and academic spin doctors have pro-
were quoted as saying they would "do nothing" to protect homosexuals from these
illegal attacks.
8 Laurence Tribe and several other scholars wrote a very influential amicus brief
in Romer that repeatedly urged the Court to consider the all-encompassing scope of
Amendment 2. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B.
Kurland, and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as Amid Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039) [hereinafter Tribe Brief].
Tribe argued that:
[a]ll the Court needs to decide in order to affirm the judgment below is that
a state's constitution by definition denies equal protection of the laws when it
decrees that homosexuality, or indeed any identifying characteristic the state
uses to select a person or class of persons from the population at large, may
never be invoked as the basis of any claim of discrimination by such persons
under any present or future law or regulation enacted by the state, its agen-
cies, or its localities.
Id at 3.
9 See Richard F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual Rights and Citizen Initia-
tives: Is Constitutionalism UnconstitutionalF, 9 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETmics & PUB. POL'Y 93,
130-34 (1995).
10 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
11 Id. at 1627.
12 The quoted language, of course, echoes Gertrude Stein's famous description
of Oakland. GERTRUDE STmIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937). Professor
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claimed Romer as a landmark victory for gay rights, 13 the reality is that
the opinion written by the Court is hardly a Magna Carta for homo-
sexuals. The Court did not reverse Bowers v. Hardwick.14 It did not
find any new fundamental ights lurking in the penumbras of the writ-
ten Constitution. It did not hold that homosexuals are a suspect or
quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. It did not hold
that moral disapproval of homosexual conduct is invidious. It did not
hold that it is illegitimate or irrational for government to make dis-
tinctions designed to discourage homosexuality. Most emphatically, it
did not say anything that calls in question laws rejecting homosexual
marriage. It did apply the lowest level of scrutiny-the rational basis
test-to laws disadvantaging homosexuals15 and explicitly held that
such laws will be upheld so long as they are "narrow enough in scope
and grounded in a sufficient factual context" for the Court to ascer-
tain that there exists "some relation between the classification and the
purpose it served." 16
In short, the problem with Amendment 2 was its all-encompass-
ing breadth.' 7 Romeris not a landmark decision endorsing gay rights;
it is a narrow and rather trivial application of what the Court called its
"ordinary" rule that "a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance
a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or
works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for
Stephen Gillers, who agrees with the results in Romer, describesJustice Kennedy's ma-
jority opinion as "so weak as to be astonishing." Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans,
LEGAL TIMES, May 27, 1996, at 8.
13 On the ReligionLaw discussion group, Romer was compared to Brown v. Board of
Education by some and said to have effectively overruled Bowers v. Hardwick by others.
Newspapers across the country proclaimed a great victory for homosexual rights. The
headline in the New York Times, which proclaimed "Gay Rights Laws Can't Be
Banned, High Court Rules," was typical of this spin on Romer. See Linda Greenhouse,
Gay Rights Laws Can't Be Banned, High Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1996, at Al.
One legal analyst went so far as to suggest that Romer may require the states to recog-
nize same-sex marriage because the heterosexual norm for civil marriage is based
upon a "'bare animus' against a group of people." Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans,
supra note 12, at 8. See also William Eskridge, Credit Is Due, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June
17, 1996, at 11. For a discussion of Romer's impact on marriage laws, see infra notes
64-72 and accompanying text.
14 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
15 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
16 Id.
17 At oral argumentJustice Kennedy described Amendment 2 as creating a classi-
fication "adopted to fence out" homosexuals "for all purposes." He then remarked
"I've never seen a statute like that." U.S. Supreme Court Official transcript at *5,
Romer, 1995 WL 605822 (No. 94-1039).
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it seems tenuous."18 Although Colorado advanced many clearly legiti-
mate interests in support of the Amendment-the liberty and associa-
tional interests of landlords and employers, and administrative
efficiency "in conserving resources to fight discrimination against
other groups," to name a few 9 -the breadth of the Amendment was
"so fat removed from these particular justifications" that the Court
found it "impossible to credit them."20 Once the Court concluded
that the extreme breadth of the Amendment outran and belied "any
legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it, ' '21 there was noth-
ing left to do but to invalidate it on its face under the ordinary test
applied by the Court in run-of-the-mill equal protection cases. So
when all the cheering and spin-doctoring are over, Bowers is still the
champ and Romer not even a contender.
A. Bowers and Romer
The argument that Romer significantly advances the cause of ho-
mosexual rights begins by describing the decision as inconsistent with
Bowers and concludes that moral opposition to homosexuality is no
longer a legitimate basis for laws that disadvantage homosexuals. 22
Bowers, of course, is the Court's 1986 landmark decision upholding
the collective right of democratic self-government, the most basic lib-
erty of a free people,23 against the claim that consensual homosexual
acts are covered by a fundamental (though unenumerated) constitu-
tional right. The Court noted that sodomy was a criminal offense at
common law, was forbidden "by the laws of the original 13 States
when they ratified the Bill of Rights," and was a crime in "all but 5 of
the 37 States" in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied.24 Indeed, the proscription has ancient roots nourished by "mil-
18 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
19 Id. at 1629.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 We had a lengthy group discussion of this issue on the ReligionLaw list. My
views and insights have been enriched and honed by these cyberspace exchanges.
23 As Robert Bork has observed, "[tihe freedom of the majority to govern and the
freedom of the individual not to be governed remain forever in tension." ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139 (1990). Justice White was very much aware of
this tension in Bowers, and he was particularly concerned about the legitimacy of the
Court adopting an expansive view of its authority to "discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194. "The Court is most
vulnerable," proclaimed Justice White, "and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution." Id.
24 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-93.
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lennia of moral teaching, ' 25 and the Court declared it would be
"facetious" for it to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy.2 6 Finally, and importantly for present purposes, Bow-
ers applied a rational basis test and held that the "presumed belief' of
the majority that "homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable"
was an adequate basis for Georgia's criminal prohibition of that con-
duct.27 Indeed, as Justice White understood, law is "constantly based
on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated... the courts will be very busy indeed."2 8
The argument that Romer has effectively reversed Bowers proceeds
backwards from Justice Scalia's dissent in the former case. 29 Scalia
argued that it should be "obvious" that Amendment 2 is constitutional
after Bowers because if Georgia may criminalize homosexual sodomy
"surely it is constitutionally permissible" for the people of Colorado to
enact a law "merely disfavoring homosexual conduct."30 But the Court
held that Amendment 2 fails the rational basis test because it was not
"directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objec-
tive." 3' So to Scalia the legal logic is: if Bowers, then Romer is wrong.
Gay rights advocates turn Scalia's analysis around and argue: if Romer,
then Bowers is no longer good law.
A careful reading of Romer, however, demonstrates that both
Scalia's criticism and the advocates' reverse spin are unjustified. Bow-
ers was not dispositive of the issues in Romer, and therefore Romer does
not signal the demise of Bowers. The primary significance of Romer in
the evolution of constitutional law lies not in any expansion of homo-
sexual rights, but rather upon the issue of facial challenges to over-
broad legislation.
There are many rational and legitimate reasons for the govern-
ment to enact laws disadvantaging (or withholding some benefit
from) homosexuals. Public morality, property rights, religious liberty,
and associational freedom are clearly proper ends of public policy,
and any one of these purposes is an adequate foundation for typical
laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation. Amendment 2,
however, went well beyond the point of implementing these purposes.
It was severely overbroad in two ways. First, it imposed what the Court
called a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
25 Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
26 Id. at 194.
27 Id. at 196.
28 Id.
29 See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30 Id. at 1631 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
31 Id. at 1629.
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group" and proscribed laws, regulations, and policies designed to pro-
tect that group against "exclusion from an almost limitless number of
transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free
society."3 2 Second, it allowed this disability to be lifted only by the
extraordinarily difficult step of amending the state constitution. 33
This extreme overbreadth clearly troubled Justice Kennedy and the
majority. It is one thing for a state to outlaw homosexual sodomy or
to define marriage to exclude same-sex relationships; it is quite a dif-
ferent thing for the state constitution to declare homosexuals-in-
cluding, apparently, those who abstain from homosexual conduct-to
be akin to outlaws by denying them access to even the "possibility of
protection under the laws of the state from the wrongs that may befall
them."34
Amendment 2 would have done much that is good had it been
allowed to go into effect.35 However, as the parade of horribles raised
by the Justices at oral argument revealed,36 it also might have pre-
vented government policies designed to protect homosexuals against
what everyone would agree are invidious (if unlikely) harms. If homo-
sexuals should ever be denied police or fire protection, access to pub-
lic libraries, or treatment at public hospitals, surely there can be no
legitimate reason to forbid government from adopting remedial poli-
cies mandating that these services shall be available without regard to
sexual orientation. Yet, under Amendment 2 these policies might be
32 Id. at 1627 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
34 Tribe Brief, supra note 8, at 8.
35 Laws forbidding private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation re-
strict liberty, and stigmatize traditional beliefs about sexual ethics as invidious and
immoral. For example, when the law tells a deeply religious landlord that it is wrong
for her to refuse to rent an apartment to a homosexual couple, it has the effect of
legitimizing homosexuality and delegitimizing the landlord's traditional religious be-
liefs. By passing Amendment 2, the people of Colorado decided to remove the stigma
and associated harms inflicted on traditionalists by state and local homosexual rights
legislation. This, in my opinion, is a very good thing to do. See Duncan & Young,
supra note 9, at 126-30.
36 Justice Kennedy declared that he had never before seen a law that classifies a
particular group and fences it out "for all purposes." Justice O'Connor worried that a
homosexual who was denied the right to borrow a library book would apparently have
no legal recourse. Justice Ginsburg was concerned that a hospital might deny homo-
sexuals access to a kidney dialysis machine. Other questions focused on homosexuals
hypothetically being denied services by the police, the health department, and the
insurance commissioner. See, U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, Romer, 1995
WL 605822 (No. 94-1039); Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Justices Hear, and Also Debate, a Gay
Rights Case, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 11, 1995, at Al.
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forbidden because they treat sexual orientation (including homosexu-
ality and bisexuality) as a protected class.
At least in theory, Amendment 2 extended well beyond any legiti-
mate state interest and, therefore, denied homosexuals equal protec-
tion of the law. This modest position represents the sum of Romer's
impact on the equal protection issue. It poses no threat to the contin-
ued vitality of the Court's ruling in Bowers, because Bowers involved a
law "narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual con-
text" to enable the Court to ascertain a reasonable relation between
the conduct prohibited (homosexual sodomy) and Georgia's legiti-
mate interest in prohibiting immoral behavior.37
B. Romer, Overbreadth, and Facial Invalidation
In Romer, the respondents' attack on Amendment 2 was a facial
challenge, and the Court's facial invalidation of Amendment 2 means
it may not be enforced under any circumstances. 38 In contrast, when
a court holds a statute unconstitutional "as applied" to a particular set
of facts, the law may be enforced in other circumstances.3 9
In United States v. Salerno,40 the Court held that a facial challenge
to a legislative act can succeed only if the challenger establishes "that
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."41
In other words, a facial attack on a law "will fail if the statute has any
constitutional application."42 The Salerno Court expressly stated that
the overbreadth doctrine, which holds that a party may claim a statute
should not be applied to him solely because it would be unconstitu-
tional to apply it in different circumstances to a hypothetical third
party,43 does not apply "outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."44
37 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
38 See id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39 See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 235, 236 (1994).
40 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
41 Id. at 745.
42 Doff, supra note 39, at 239. Professor Dorf calls the Salerno test a "truly draco-
nian standard" and argues that the test "finds little support in the Supreme Court's
cases and is unsound in principle." Id. at 239, 294. Doff argues that "substantially
overbroad" laws-in the sense that potentially invalid applications are substantial
when compared to valid applications-should be subject to facial invalidation. Id. at
276.
43 See id. at 261.
44 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
[VOL- 72:2
WIGSTOCK AND THE KULTURKAMPF
In his Romerdissent,Justice Scalia argued that the facial challenge
to Amendment 2 must fail under Salerno, because the Amendment was
"unquestionably" constitutional in at least some applications. 45 Cer-
tainly, Scalia's argument has force. But I think there is a counterargu-
ment that also has resonance. As Professor Doff has shown, if a
statute has an "impermissible purpose, courts cannot save it by sever-
ing its unconstitutional applications. The invalid legislative purpose
pervades all of the provision's applications."46
Doff's insight seems to explain Romer. Although the shallowness
of Justice Kennedy's opinion rivals that of the Platte River in a
drought year, he seems to conclude that the extreme breadth of
Amendment 2 suggests an impermissible purpose that permeates all
of the Amendment's applications. Indeed, Kennedy repeatedly makes
the point that the "sheer breadth" of Amendment 2 "seems inexplica-
ble by anything but animus toward the class that it affects,"47 and
therefore outruns and belies "any legitimate justifications that may be
claimed" in support of the Amendment.48 If you can go this far with
the Court, the rest seems to follow. Because of the inference of ani-
mus drawn from the conceivably unlimited reach of the initiative, the
clearly legitimate purposes advanced by the State in support of
Amendment 2 were tainted and "impossible to credit."49 This posi-
tions the case squarely within the rule of Salerno and facial invalidation
follows inexorably.50
Although the Romer opinion adopts a defensible application of
rational basis review even in the context of a facial challenge, I believe
the case was wrongly decided. The defensibility of the opinion turns
on the Court's almost singie-minded focus on the conceivable breadth
of Amendment 2. Yes, if police officers refuse to protect homosexual
45 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46 Dorf, supra note 39, at 279. Doff cites Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987), as evidence that the Salerno rule "does not apply to facial challenges to statutes
with an unconstitutional purpose." Id. at 280.
47 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
48 Id. at 1629.
49 Id. The primary reasons advanced by the State in support of the Amendment
were the liberty interests of employers and landlords, and Colorado's interest in "con-
serving resources to fight discrimination against other groups." Id These interests
are clearly legitimate ones. They failed to support Amendment 2 only because the
Court found the "breadth of the Amendment" was "so far removed from these partic-
ular justifications" as to render them inoperative. Id. Having made this determina-
tion, the Court concluded that the Amendment "is a status-based enactment divorced
from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests." Id.
50 Id.
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crime victims and if library clerks refuse to allow homosexuals to bor-
row books, Amendment 2 might be interpreted to prohibit remedial
policies specifically declaring that the government does not discrimi-
nate in the provision of these services on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. And yes, these results are not related to any legitimate
governmental purpose. But why should we think these scenarios will
ever occur or were intended by the voters of Colorado when they ap-
proved the initiative? Isn't it at least possible that this hypothetical
problem might be cured through a narrow interpretation of Amend-
ment 2 when (and if) such a case should ever arise?5' As Justice Ken-
nedy himself said in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,52
courts should not invalidate laws "on a facial challenge based upon a
worst-case analysis that may never occur."53
If Amendment 2 had been judged based upon its likely (as op-
posed to its imagined) applications, it would easily have survived a
facial challenge under a rational basis test. Its likely and immediate
impact would have been to prohibit laws and policies giving homosex-
uals special protection against discrimination in employment, hous-
ing, and public accommodations. It would not have required public
or private discrimination against homosexuals; it would simply have
forbidden government from adopting policies treating homosexual
acts and inclinations as protected traits. It would have proscribed
laws-like those enacted in Boulder, Aspen, and Denver-that specifi-
cally forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Unlike
laws that generally forbid arbitrary discrimination by public or quasi-
public institutions, "gay-rights" laws single out sexual behavior and in-
clinations as specially protected categories and then employ the law's
coercion to force dissenters to comply with this particular vision of
justice.
Certainly, the people of Colorado might have had many rational
and legitimate reasons for supporting a constitutional amendment
designed to invalidate laws that conflate the values of the sexual
revolution with those of the civil rights movement. Gay rights laws
such as those enacted in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver do not bestow
benefits without costs. For every economic and symbolic benefit pro-
vided homosexuals and bisexuals by gay rights laws there is a corre-
sponding economic and social cost imposed upon others in the
51 See Doff, supra note 39, at 274-75. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446,
458 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that no rational basis exists "for permitting one student
to assault another based on the victim's sexual orientation" where a public school
failed to protect an openly gay student from physical assaults and harassment).
52 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
53 Id. at 514.
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community. Homosexuals gain protected status in employment and
housing; employers and landlords lose freedom of choice, control
over their businesses, and perhaps even religious freedom.54 Homo-
sexuals gain social legitimacy when the law (in effect) declares sexual
orientation, like race and gender, to be irrelevant to a person's char-
acter or worth; traditionalists, however, are stigmatized and delegi-
timized when the law (in effect) adopts the proposition "that
opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious
bias."55 Just as it is rational and legitimate for homosexuals and their
advocates to support gay rights laws to acquire these benefits, it is ra-
tional and legitimate for others to seek to avoid these costs by support-
ing laws like Amendment 2.
C. Romer As Law: Some Specific Applications
Although Romerwill be cited by gay rights advocates as controlling
every case in which a law or government policy classifies on the basis
of sexual orientation or behavior, the majority's narrow holding in the
case suggests that this strategy is likely to be unproductive. In fact, the
narrow holding of Romer suggests quite strongly that typical laws dis-
advantaging homosexuals do not offend the Equal Protection Clause.
Consider, for example, the following specific applications of Romer.
54 For example, the Aspen ordinance, which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation, con-
tains no exceptions. It applies to all employers, all housing, and all public
accommodations without regard to the size of the business or the religious conscience
of persons subject to the restrictions. There is not even an exception for churches
and religious ministries. SeeAspen, Colo. Mun. Code § 13-98. In his dissenting opin-
ion in Evans v. Romer, Colorado Supreme CourtJustice Erickson stated that the Aspen
ordinance requires "churches to open their facilities to homosexual organizations if
the facilities were opened to any community organization." Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d
1335, 1363 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996). Thus, if a church in Aspen allows, say, a local right-to-life group to conduct a
meeting on its premises, it must grant equal access to homosexual organizations. Of
course, at least some religiously motivated dissenters might be able to claim a reli-
gious freedom exception under the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act. See generally Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual
Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NoTP. DAMF L. Rv. 393
(1994). But litigating a free exercise claim is not a cost-free process, and religious
freedom exemptions do nothing for employers and property owners whose opposi-
tion to homosexuality is based upon secular notions of sexual morality.
55 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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1. State Constitutional Amendments
Suppose that in response to Romer, the people of some state pass
an initiative amending the state constitution to forbid all state and
local government action that restricts "the right of private employers
and property owners to take sexual orientation into account when
making decisions regarding employment or the sale or rental of real
property." This hypothetical initiative accomplishes much of Amend-
ment 2's agenda, but it differs in significant respects from that uncon-
stitutional provision. First, since everyone has sexual orientation, it
creates a "disability" that applies to everyone, not to a "single named
group. '5 6 Under the hypothetical initiative, no one may use the law's
coercion to forbid private employers and landlords from treating sex-
ual orientation as a relevant qualification for employment or housing
opportunities.
Second, the hypothetical amendment applies only to a narrow
range of activities and does not create a "broad and undifferentiated
disability" 57 that denies "protection across the board."5 8 The parade
of horribles imagined by the Romer majority cannot be used to slander
this initiative. The hypothetical law thus succeeds where Amendment
2 failed-it is "narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient
factual context" to enable the Court to ascertain that there exists
"some relation between the classification and the purpose it served."59
For example, the proposed initiative serves the legitimate inter-
ests of protecting the economic liberties, associational freedom, and
rights of religious and moral conscience of private employers and
landlords.60 In a free society, these interests are clearly legitimate
ones. Indeed, only two years ago the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
the "right to exclude others is 'one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.'"61
56 d. at 1627. This is what Justice Kennedy presumably meant when he said
Amendment 2 "is at once too narrow and too broad." Id. at 1628. The Amendment
was too narrow because it "targeted" a "single named group"--homosexuals and
bisexuals. Id. at 1626-27. It was too broad because it imposed "a broad and undiffer-
entiated disability" on that targeted class by denying them "protection across the
board." Id. at 1627-28. The hypothetical initiative does not single out a small group
of persons; rather, it applies to a trait-sexual orientation-shared by every single
person in the human community, because each one of us has sexual orientation.
57 Id at 1627.
58 Id. at 1628.
59 Id. at 1627.
60 See Duncan & Young, supra note 9, at 130-34.
61 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
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The Romer majority specifically addressed these legitimate interests
and said that they failed to support Amendment 2 only because the
breadth of that provision was "so far removed from these particular
justifications."62 The hypothetical amendment, however, is not fatally
overbroad; there is a reasonable fit between that provision and legiti-
mate governmental purposes.63
Romerdoes not stand in the way of this initiative. If the Court is to
strike it down, it will need to find some other rationale.
2. Marriage Laws
Within a week after the Court announced its decision in Romer,
David Sobelsohn, a Washington lawyer and former chief legislative
counsel of a leading homosexual advocacy group, confidently pre-
dicted that "Romerwill help the constitutional case against state refusal
to recognize same-sex marriage" because "[a]fter all, one can also
trace that refusal to 'bare animus' against a group of people."64 I
think this view is based upon a mistaken understanding of both Romer
and state marriage laws.
Same-sex marriage 65 has been unanimously and consistently re-
jected by the laws of every state in this country.66 Indeed, at present
no country or state in the world recognizes homosexual unions as mar-
riages. This unanimous, international, and multicultural consensus
on the meaning of marriage has a solid, rational, and clearly legiti-
62 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
63 The proposed initiative also serves the legitimate interest of preserving "tradi-
tional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those
mores" by passing local ordinances that equate opposition to sexual immorality with
racism and sexism. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64 Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans, supra note 12, at 8. Professor William Es-
kridge, an articulate academic advocate of the homosexual legal agenda, made the
same point in a recent essay calling for legal recognition of homosexual marriage.
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 11.
65 The phrases "same-sex marriage" and "homosexual marriage," as used in this
Article, refer to a legal marriage between persons of the same gender.
66 See Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal
O'Connor a "Homophobe"', 10 NoTPE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 587, 589 (1996).
In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that
the Hawaii marriage statute, which does not permit same-sex marriage, discriminates
on the basis of gender and therefore triggers strict scrutiny under the state constitu-
tion. The case was remanded to the trial court to allow the state an opportunity to
meet its burden ofjustifying the marriage law "by demonstrating that it furthers com-
pelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of
constitutional rights." Id. at 68.
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mate foundation that should easily withstand any assault based upon
Romer.
State marriage laws do not create a broad and undifferentiated
disability denying homosexuals "across the board" protection against
an infinite number of potential wrongs. These laws have a specific
context that easily permits the courts to apply rational basis analysis. 67
It is crucial to recognize that when homosexual activists seek va-
lidity for same-sex marriages they are demanding much more than
tolerance. Marriage is a governmentally endorsed and specially pre-
ferred legal status that is recognized as fundamentally important to an
ordered and healthy society.68 The unanimous international consen-
sus supporting conventional marriage is based upon the widely ac-
cepted understanding that a man and woman united in marriage
"constitute a unit that is more complete, more comprehensive, more
whole, more balanced, more complementary, and more liberating
than any relationship of two persons of the same sex can ever be."69
In other words, the "heterosexual marriage requirement... recog-
nizes the unique social importance of the institution of marriage for
relationships, complementarity, and generativity that lie at the heart
of the social interest in marriage. 7 0 Far from being based upon a
desire to engage in invidious discrimination for its own sake, conven-
tional marriage laws recognize "the equal contribution of both sexes
to an important social institution." 71
The case for conventional marriage laws may be debatable, 72 but
it is neither irrational nor invidious. And Romer is no threat to the
heterosexual paradigm of civil marriage.
67 The analysis in this Article is limited to the impact of Romer on marriage laws.
Romerapplied a rational basis test to Amendment 2. Some commentators have argued
in favor of stricter scrutiny for laws that deny recognition to homosexual "marriages."
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
68 See Duncan, supra note 66, at 592-93.
69 Id. at 596 (quoting Professor Lynn Wardle).
70 Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 85-86.
71 Id. at 87.
72 For an articulate argument in support of legal recognition of homosexual mar-
riages, see ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUAL-
iTY, 178-87 (1995).
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3. Homosexuals in the Military
The exclusion of homosexuals from military service has a long
and interesting history.73 That history, however, is beyond the scope
of this Article. Instead, I will focus briefly on the most recent policy
regarding homosexuals in the military-the 1993 legislation popularly
known as the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy 4 -- and consider the im-
pact of Romer on that controversial rule.
The statutory policy provides that a member of the armed forces
shall be separated from service if any one of the following circum-
stances is shown: 1) the service member engages or attempts to en-
gage in homosexual acts;75 2) the service member states that "he or
she is a homosexual or bisexual.., unless there is a further finding
... that the member has demonstrated that he or she is not a person
who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in,
or intends to engage in homosexual acts;"7 6 or 3) the service member
"has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same
biological sex."77 This policy excludes from military service a class of
persons defined with reference to conduct or propensity to engage in
conduct. Moreover, it creates a rebuttable presumption that self-de-
clared "homosexuals" or "bisexuals" are members of that class. Once
this presumption arises, the individual can rebut it only by showing
that he or she is not a person who has a propensity to engage in ho-
mosexual acts.78 In sum, the statutory scheme creates "a class-based
exclusion policy premised upon the principle that homosexuality is
defined by and inextricably linked to homosexual conduct and is,
therefore, incompatible with military service. '79
Like the other laws discussed in the two immediately preceding
sections of this Article, the statutory policy is sufficiently narrow to
73 See generally MELISSA WELLS-PErRY, EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT
TO SERVE (1993); William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and Militay Service: Legislation,
Implementation, and Litigation, 64 UMKC L. REV. 121 (1995).
74 Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1670 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C . § 654
(West Supp. 1996)).
75 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b) (1). The term "homosexual act" is defined as "any bodily
contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex
for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires." Id. § 654(f) (3).
76 Id. § 654(b)(2).
77 Id. § 654(b) (3).
78 See Woodruff, supra note 73, at 155. In other words, a self-declared "homosex-
ual" must demonstrate that he or she is not a "homosexual" as defined by the statu-
tory policy. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(f) (1) (defining "homosexual" as "a person
regardless of sex, who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage
in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts ...
79 See Woodruff, supra note 73, at 155.
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enable the courts to ascertain whether it is a reasonable means of fur-
thering legitimate governmental interests. Indeed, the Congressional
findings of fact establishing the purpose of and need for the policy
provide a reasoned and measured justification for excluding practic-
ing homosexuals (and those with a propensity to engage in homosex-
ual conduct) from military service.80 These findings recognize the
unique context of military service. The primary purpose of the Ameri-
can armed forces is to "prepare for and to prevail in combat should
the need arise." 81 This requires military personnel to make "ex-
traordinary sacrifices" and to accept life in "military units that are
characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit co-
hesion." 82 William A. Woodruff, a law professor and former chief liti-
gator in the Judge Advocate General's Corps, explains the unique
context of military service as follows:
The American Armed Forces are unique. In a government based
upon the consent of the governed, the military is autocratic. In a
society that treasures individual freedom, the soldier must conform
and sacrifice individual freedom for mission accomplishment. In a
country where the right to speak one's mind is paramount, the sol-
dier is called upon to defend that right while not enjoying its full
extent. To some, it is paradoxical that the defenders of freedom
must forfeit their own freedom. Consider the mission of the mili-
tary, however, and the paradox vanishes. The mission of the United
States Armed Forces is to fight and win our nation's wars. It takes
an army to do that, not a debating society.83
It is in light of this extraordinary context that the courts must
consider the reasonableness of the Congressional determination that
"[t] he presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an
unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capabil-
ity."84 Nothing in Romer suggests that this determination is an illegiti-
mate basis for Congressional action. Congress did not base its policy
upon "bare animus" or invidious bigotry; "[r] ather, it focused on mili-
tary effectiveness, unit cohesion, the unique nature of military life,
and the impact homosexual conduct in the military would have, ulti-
80 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(a).
81 Id. § 654(a)(4).
82 Id.§654(a)(5), (6).
83 Woodruff, supra note 73, at 123.
84 10 U.S.CGA. § 654(a) (15).
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mately, on success on the battlefield."85 As Professor Woodruff has
said, the policy "is not 'anti-gay;"' it is "'pro-combat effectiveness."' 86
Moreover, Congress adopted the policy only after an "exhaustive ex-
amination" of the issue "in the Executive and Legislative branches."87
Far from being based upon a visceral dislike of homosexual persons,
the policy "reflects month upon month of political negotiation and
deliberation."88 Although an exhaustive analysis of the issue of homo-
sexuals in the military is beyond the scope of this Article,8 9 suffice it to
say I am confident that Romer does not bear upon the issue.
85 Woodruff, supra note 73, at 165. When Justice Kennedy was on the Court of
Appeals in the Ninth Circuit, he specifically found that the Navy's "general policy of
discharging all homosexuals is rational." Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809 n.20
(9th Cir. 1980). This precedent did not escape Justice Scalia's notice in Romer. See
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86 Woodnff, supra note 73, at 165. Soldiers and sailors often are required to live
in "communal settings that force intimacy and provide little privacy." Id. at 161 (quot-
ing General Colin Powell). Woodruff provides a cogent explanation of how homosex-
uality-in this unique context-can disrupt the bonding and cohesion essential to
military effectiveness:
To provide a modicum of privacy in these situations, the military has tradi-
tionally segregated bathing and sleeping facilities by gender. The presump-
tion underlying gender segregation is that people are sexually attracted to
the opposite sex. Thus, most people view being forced to sleep, shower, and
use toilet facilities with members of the opposite sex as an infringement of
their privacy. When the underlying presumption is not valid, e.g., when in-
dividuals find members of the same gender sexually attractive, the invasion
of privacy occurs even in gender segregated facilities. This, in turn, disrupts
the bonding and cohesion vital to military effectiveness.
Id. Andrew Koppelman argues that the privacy argument fails because the "sexual
gaze" of homosexuals "is not peculiar to the military. Civilians experience it all the
time in public restrooms and changing rooms at the beach or in the gym." Andrew
Koppelman, Gaze in the Military: A Response to Professor Woodruff, 64 UMKC L. Rv. 179,
190 (1995). This counterargument is unpersuasive. Civilians are not required to
share living and sleeping quarters with strangers who may be sexually attracted to
them. Woodruff's point is that even soldiers are entitled to "a modicum of privacy in
these situations." Woodruff, supra note 73, at 161.
87 Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 922 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3305
(U.S. Oct. 21, 1996) (No. 96-1). In Thom sson, the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statutory policy.
88 Id. at 923. The court noted that extensive Congressional hearings were held
on the issue and the witnesses who testified at these hearings "represented a broad
range of views and backgrounds." Id. at 922.
89 Professor Woodruff's important article has already performed that task. See
Woodruff, supra note 73, at 155-78. Woodruff makes an important distinction be-
tween the statutory policy and the Department of Defense regulations issued to imple-
ment the law. He believes the latter "contradict the expressed views of Congress in
several important areas, are inconsistent with the statutory scheme in other respects,
and weaken the overall basis of the statute by creating irrational and illogical pre-
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III. SUPREME COURT STORYrELLING: HEREIN OF HOMOSEXUAL
FUNDAMENTALISM, ATTAINDER, AND KULTURKAMPF
Viewed as legal precedent, Romer (as I've suggested) does not
even register on the landmark meter. But when the majority and dis-
senting opinions are read as narratives of contemporary culture, they
tell fascinating stories from starkly different perspectives.
A. Justice Kennedy's Story: Fighting for the Right to Be Queer
Justice Kennedy's opinion reminds me of one of my favorite films
of the nineties, Wigstock: The Movie.90 Wigstock is a documentary about
the drag queen festival held on Labor Day each year in-did you need
to ask?-New York City. Wigstock is camp. It is outrageous. It is bi-
zarre. It is screamingly funny and wrenchingly sad-just like Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Romer.
And, also like Kennedy's opinion, the film adopts a viewpoint that
can best be described as homosexual fundamentalism. By homosex-
ual fundamentalism I mean a point of view that confidently and ag-
gressively proclaims the self-evident goodness of homosexuality-of
"queerness" to use the vernacular of homosexual activism-and con-
comitantly equates traditional sexual morality with racial bigotry and
hatred. This viewpoint is captured by the battle cry of the homosexual
rights movement-"We're here. We're queer. Get used to it."9 1-and
in the rhetoric of homosexual writers such as the late Paul Monette,
whose list of "our enemies" included "Nazi Popes and all their bro-
caded minions [and] the wacko fundamentalists and their Book of
sumptions." Id. at 173. For an impassioned response to Woodruff, see Koppelman,
supra note 86. Professor Koppelman notes that the heterosexual proclivities of male
and female officers in the armed forces have also endangered military discipline and
suggests ironically that perhaps "the only solution is wholesale castration." Id. at 190.
For Woodruff's reply to Koppelman, see William A. Woodruff, A Reply to Professor Kop-
pelman, 64 UMKC L. REv. 195 (1995).
90 WiosTOCK: THE MOVIE (Goldwyn 1995). Wigstock features performances by
Misstress Formika, RuPaul, The Lady Bunny, and (my personal favorite) the Duelling
Bankheads, "a pair of dressed-in-black queens who do Tallulah Bankhead singing
'Born to Be Wild.'" Edward Guthmann, Lady Bunny Goes Uptown in Drag/Mainstream
Release for '"Vigstock," S.F. CHRON., June 20, 1995, at El. The movie also introduces us
to the Wigstock Dancers, a troop of heel-kicking drag queens described in the film as
having been "recruited from all over-the Port Authority men's room, Rikers Island,
the piers." Barry Shils, the writer and director of Wigstock, said in an interview that the
film was designed to make drag "mainstream." Id.
91 The homosexual activist group Queer Nation has been credited with coining
this rallying cry. See Chris Dickinson, The Music is the Message: Some Radical Gay Bands
Put Their Sexuality Way Up Front, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 21, 1996, at 3C
(Magazine).
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Lies."92 It is also an important theme of Wigstock and is captured best
in a song performed by Misstress Formika:
You want to come out, but you don't know how.
You tell your mom you're gay, and she has a f-ing cow.
She sends you to a shrink, but it just don't work.
'Cuz you still feel the same, it's the shrink that's the jerk.
You've got to fight for your right to be queer.
You've got to fight for your right to be queer.93
Although Justice Kennedy was less confrontational than Queer
Nation, less impassioned than Monette, and less flamboyant than
Misstress Formika, their fundamentalism echoes in his majority
opinion.
Kennedy's decision to invalidate Amendment 2 on its face is sen-
sible only if-as Akhil Amar suggests-Kennedy accepts the homosex-
ual fundamentalist narrative as the true story of Amendment 2.9 4
According to this story, which is the dominant one among the edu-
cated elite in American society,95 the Amendment was intended to
stigmatize homosexuals as an unclean, untouchable, and unworthy
class of persons. 96 If you believe this narrative, then Colorado is in-
deed the "hate state" and Amendment 2 is the equivalent of a bill of
92 PAUL MONETTE, BECOMING A MAN: HALF A LiFE STORY 2 (1992). Monette won
the 1992 National Book Award for this autobiographical account of growing up ho-
mosexual in America. Monette's hatred for people of faith and the Word of God calls
to mind the following proverb: "An unjust man is an abomination to the righteous,
and he who is upright in the way is an abomination to the wicked." Proverbs 29:27. Of
course, the reason we are waging Kulturkampf is we don't agree on the identity of the
"wicked" and the "upright." However, it is clear that homosexual fundamentalists-
such as Monette-believe that traditional Christianity is homophobic and, therefore,
an abomination. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer, while not going this far, em-
ploys some of the same frightening rhetoric.
93 WIGSTOCK: THE MOVIE (Goldwyn 1995). Misstress Formika, whose real name is
Michael, also provides a less theatrical analysis of contemporary culture. Offstage and
sans wig, she/he observes: "They're trying to brainwash us to be prejudiced, to be
close-minded, to be Republicans. It's not going to happen. Not as long as I'm
around."
94 Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REv. 203, 207, 223-24 (1996).
95 Professor Stephen Gillers agrees that Kennedy's opinion is a product of the
dominant insider narrative. As he puts it, the Romer majority simply seemed to be
saying "We read the press and the better magazines" and we understand that Amend-
ment 2 is based upon "hate and we won't tolerate hate, so beat it." Getting a Read on
Romer v. Evans, supra note 12, at 8.
96 Amar, supra note 94, at 224.
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attainder,97 a law serving no purpose other than a "bare... desire to
harm a politically unpopular group."98
Professor Amar makes an admirable attempt to persuade us that
'Justice Kennedy's opinion reaches the right result, and for the right
reason."99 Amar argues that Amendment 2 is like a bill of attainder
because it names a class of persons and pins a "badge of opprobrium"
on members of the class based upon their status. 100 It was, says Amar,
"a kind of 'No Queers' sign writ large,"101 a "legal and social outlawry
in cowboy country-a targeting of outsiders, a badge of second-class
citizenship, a tainting of queers, a scarlet Q."1102
Amar argues that Amendment 2 is like a law that provides: "Akhil
Reed Amar shall be placed in the public stocks for two hours. His
private parts shall be painted red. Passersby may mock, insult, and
humiliate him. ' 103 Or one that provides: "Akhil Reed Amar shall be
ineligible to be a government employee or a union leader. °10 4 These
laws violate the non-attainder principle, Amar argues, because their
"purpose and social meaning... is to stigmatize or degrade a named
person-to 'taint' or 'stain' him, or to label him as less worthy or de-
serving of less respect or trust than his fellow citizens .... .1 05 He says
Amendment 2 violates this non-attainder principle because "there is a
right not to be singled out by name in a law that, metaphorically
speaking, paints one's private parts red."10 6
Interestingly, Professor Amar believes there would have been no
attainder problem if Amendment 2 had been symmetrical. In other
words, a law that provides sexual orientation may not be a protected
trait under anti-discrimination laws would pass muster, because such a
law would not single out a particular class of persons as Untouchable
and unclean.10 7 I doubt if this formal revision would have satisfied the
97 See Amar, supra note 94.
98 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
99 Amar, supra note 94, at 222. Amar's analysis of Romer is thoughtful, creative,
and provocative. However, it is unpersuasive because it is based on the same unrealis-
tic narrative that animates Kennedy's opinion. For a discussion of why the narrative
of homosexual fundamentalism is not the true story of Amendment 2, see infra notes
120-54 and accompanying text.
100 Amar, supra note 94, at 214.
101 Id. at 207.
102 Id. at 208.
103 Id. at 211.
104 Id. at 212.
105 Id. at 213
106 Id. at 219.
107 See id. at 207, 224-25.
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Romer Court. The revised amendment would still prohibit laws, regu-
lations, and policies designed to protect the trait of sexual orientation
against "an almost limitless number" of conceivable wrongs.' 08 For
example, the revised amendment would not cure the parade of hor-
ribles-involving such things as police protection and library serv-
ices-produced by the Court's obsession with the conceivable reach of
Amendment 2.109 Although Amar's attainder analysis provides an in-
teresting angle from which to view Romer, the case was decided as "an
ordinary equal protection case," and substituting the trait of sexual
orientation for that of homosexuality in the text of the Amendment
should not significantly affect its review under the rational basis test.
Its "sheer breadth" would seemingly still be seen by Justice Kennedy as
discrediting any legitimate justification put forward on its behalf." 0
Amar is correct, however, when he observes that the majority
opinion is animated by the homosexual fundamentalist narrative.' 1 '
It is surely no accident that Justice Kennedy begins his story by quot-
ing Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson:12 "One cen-
tury ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."'13
Of course, Kennedy understands that notwithstanding Harlan's fa-
mous aphorism the Constitution does indeed tolerate all sorts of
classes.'1 4 Most laws divide citizens into classes (the poor get food
stamps, the wealthy do not; the elderly receive social security pay-
ments, the young pay social security taxes), and most laws do not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause. As Justice Rehnquist once put it, the
108 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
109 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. I am not arguing that the asym-
metry of Amendment 2 was irrelevant to the decision in Romer. Justice Kennedy
clearly believed that Amendment 2 was "at once too narrow and too broad." Romer,
116 S. Ct at 1628. See supra note 56. The revised amendment cures the "narrowness"
problem by denying protection not only to "homos and bis" but also to "heteros."
Amar, supra note 94, at 207. However, the revision leaves uncorrected the excessive
breadth problem, and this is probably sufficient to run afoul of the majority decision
in Romer. For an example of a revised amendment that cures both the narrowness
and the breadth problem, see supra Section 1.C.1.
111 Amar, supra note 94, at 223-24 ("Justice Kennedy's opinion ranges beyond text
and form to ponder the exclusionary social meaning beneath the surface of Amend-
ment 2."); see also id. at 207.
112 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
113 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). You do not need to be Fellini to understand the symbolic
significance of Kennedy's rhetorical linkage of Romer and Plessy. See Amar, supra note
94, at 222-23.
114 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
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problem presented by the Equal Protection Clause is one of sorting
through mounds of perfectly legitimate legislative distinctions in or-
der to isolate and invalidate those few "which involve invidiously une-
qual treatment."11 5
But Kennedy saw Amendment 2 as denying protection to homo-
sexuals "across the board"' 16 and thereby raising "the inevitable infer-
ence that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected." 11 7 Kennedy's fundamentalism made it im-
possible for him to see anything but a "bare desire" to harm homosex-
uals motivating the people of Colorado when they enacted
Amendment 2.118 It made it impossible for him "to credit" the many
legitimate justifications offered in support of the Amendment. n 9 In
other words, his narrative blinded him to the social reality of Amend-
ment 2, a reality that is much more complex and nuanced than the
black and white dogmatism of Kennedy's insider narrative.
B. Justice Scalia and the Kulturkampf
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer has been criticized
harshly by a number of legal scholars and pundits. Professor Amar
calls it "derisive"' 20 and "uncharitable." 2 1 William Lockard said he
was "infuriated" by "the hatefulness bubbling underneath the dis-
sent"'22 and terrified by "Scalia's skillful weaving of an emotional anti-
homosexual motif through his text.' 23 Richard Rodriguez stigmatized
the opinion as "venomous.' 24 Although I believe the dissent is none
of these things, I am not surprised at this reaction. Scalia explicitly
rejects the homosexual fundamentalist narrative as the true story of
Amendment 2 and, of course, that makes him a "homophobe" and a
"bigot" to insiders such as these critics.' 25
115 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
116 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1629.
120 Amar, supra note 94, at 228.
121 Id. at 234.
122 Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans, supra note 12, at 8. Lockard, a vice president
and legal counsel of MGM, also called the dissent "vicious" and "homophobic." Id.
123 Id.
124 Richard Rodriguez, The Revolution Occurs by the Christmas Tree, BALTIMOREa SUN,
May 24, 1996, at 23A.
125 For a discussion of the meaning of "homosexual fundamentalism," see supra
notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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Like Justice Kennedy before him, 2 6 Justice Scalia wasted no time
before telling his version of the Amendment 2 story. "The Court,"
said Scalia:
has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional
amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a
"'bare... desire to harm"' homosexuals .... but is rather a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to
revise those mores through use of the laws.' 27
In contrast to Kennedy's simplistic "hate state" fundamentalism,
Scalia understood that Amendment 2 has a history, and its purpose
can be gleaned only by one who takes account of that history.'28
Amendment 2 is part of a complex struggle between modernism
and traditionalism, between competing and conflicting notions of the
good life. The Amendment was not a mean-spirited attempt to stig-
matize, degrade, or "taint" a class of persons. Rather, it was a defen-
sive measure designed to prevent the law's coercion from being used
to legitimize homosexuality and delegitimize traditional notions of
sexual morality.' 29
In a 1993 law review article, Professor Larry Yackle declared that
"American society is now absorbed in yet another great civil rights
movement, this one on behalf of gay, lesbian, and ambisexual citizens,
which will lead ineluctably to the elimination of legal burdens on the
basis of sexual orientation." 3 0 Moreover, when this codification of
the sexual revolution is accomplished, "private homophobia, deprived
126 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
127 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128 Justice Scalia noted that persons "who engage in homosexual conduct tend to
reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities" and often amass substan-
tial political power in those communities. Id. at 1634. This political power can be
used to enact laws designed to produce "not merely a grudging social toleration, but
full social acceptance, of homosexuality." Id. Scalia then placed Amendment 2 in its
social context, explaining that by the time Colorado citizens were asked to vote on the
initiative "their exposure to homosexuals' quest for social endorsement" had been
informed by enactment of restrictive gay rights laws in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver.
d. These laws, noted Scalia, had the effect of "equating the moral disapproval, of
homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry." Id.
129 I have written extensively elsewhere of the stigmatization of traditionalists by
gay rights laws such as those passed in Denver, Aspen, and Boulder. See Duncan &
Young, supra note 9, at 124-30. Viewed against this background, Amendment 2 was
designed not to stigmatize and harm homosexuals, but rather to remove the stigma
and associated harms inflicted on traditionalists by state and local gay rights laws. Id.
at 129.
130 Larry W. Yackle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the Feast of St. Patrick 73
B.U. L. REv. 791 (1993).
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of legal sanction, will.., be discredited and forced to the margin."131
As the people of Colorado understood, this "private homophobia"
that is to be discredited by the educative effects of laws enacting ho-
mosexual rights is what others call "traditional sexual morality," and
the "homophobes" who are in the process of being stigmatized and
marginalized are ordinary people like themselves. In other words,
they came to understand the social meaning of "We're here. We're
queer. Get used to it."182 It was the "get used to it" part that informed
and animated support for Amendment 2 among these "seemingly tol-
erant" Coloradans. 33
Justice Scalia understood the social reality of Amendment 2, and
he ridiculed the majority's unrealistic "portrayal of Coloradans as a
society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled 'gay-bashing' so false as to
be comical."' 3 4 Not only had Colorado repealed its antisodomy laws,
observed Scalia, but it was one of the first states to do so. 135 However,
three cities in Colorado had gone well beyond the point of tolerating
homosexual conduct and had passed laws "equating the moral disap-
proval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry."136
This, said Scalia, is all well and good. Homosexuals, like everyone else
in a democratic society, are "entitled to use the legal system for rein-
forcement of their moral sentiments."137 However, those who use the
system to impose their moral preferences on others should not be
heard to complain when their agenda is "countered by lawful, demo-
cratic countermeasures" such as Amendment 2.138
Not only did Justice Scalia understand this complex social reality
of Colorado, he also understood the social reality of the Supreme
131 Id. at 792.
132 This phrase has become the rallying cry of the homosexual rights movement.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. Its social meaning is one of intolerance. It
tells traditionalists that "homosexuality is good and legitimate, and if you have a prob-
lem with that you are going to have to change." Indeed, if we accept the major prem-
ise-a premise that declares the equal goodness of homosexuality, bisexuality, and
heterosexuality-the logic is compelling. If homosexual unions are good and legiti-
mate, institutions and persons who proclaim traditional sexual morality are
"homophobic" and roughly equivalent to the Ku Klux Klan and similar racist organi-
zations. If homosexuality is good, the Bible-as it is understood by traditional Jews,
Catholics, and Protestants-is hate literature. If homosexuality is legitimate, Paul Mo-
nette was a prophet, not a religious bigot. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text accompanying note 127.
134 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135 I&
136 Id. at 1634.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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Court and, more generally, of the legal profession. In one of the most
candid assessments of the Court and the legal system ever written in a
Supreme court opinion, Scalia implied that traditionalists cannot re-
ceive a fair hearing in litigation raising issues such as those in Romer
When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with
the knights rather than the villeins-and more specifically with the
Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from
which the Court's Members are drawn. How that class feels about
homosexuality will be evident to anyone who wishes to interview job
applicants at virtually any of the Nation's law schools. The inter-
viewer may refuse to offer ajob because the applicant is a Republi-
can; because he is an adulterer; because he went to the wrong prep
school or belongs to the wrong country club; because he eats snails;
because he is a womanizer; because she wears real-animal fur; or
even because he hates the Chicago Cubs. But if the interviewer
should wish not to be an associate or partner of an applicant be-
cause he disapproves of the applicant's homosexuality, then he will
have violated the pledge which the Association of American Law
Schools requires all its member-schools to exact from job interview-
ers .... 139
In other words, elite institutions like the Court and legal
academia have accepted homosexual fundamentalism as true and are
committed to "stamp[ing] out" the "more plebeian" narrative that
equates gay rightswith specialrights.14° Thus, the decision by the major-
ity in Romer was "an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political
will.'141
C. A Personal Narrative
It should already be obvious which of the Romer narratives I be-
lieve best captures the "true" story of Amendment 2. The people of
Colorado did not vote for the Amendment out of hatred or animosity
for gays and lesbians. They believed that gay rights legislation, such as
that enacted in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver, sweeps beyond the point
of tolerance and grants "special rights" to homosexuals.
I was an advocate in Romer. I wrote an amicus brief in support of
the Amendment.142 My personal support for the Amendment was
139 Id. at 1637.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Alabama, California, Idaho, Nebraska, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia in Support of Petitioner, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039). I wrote the brief with Charles Cooper, who appeared
as Counsel of Record.
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animated by libertarian considerations. As I have argued at length
elsewhere, 143 I believe Professor Yackle is correct when he links enact-
ment of gay rights laws with the discrediting and marginalization of
traditional notions of sexual morality and religion.1 4 AsJustice Scalia
understood, laws that list sexual orientation as an impermissible
ground for private discrimination have the educative effect of "equat-
ing the moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and reli-
gious bigotry."145  It is in this sense that laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation grant "special rights."
When a state or local government codifies the sexual revolution
by treating sexual lifestyles as protected categories under antidis-
crimination laws, it stigmatizes, marginalizes, and silences religious
and moral traditionalists and fences them out from authentic partici-
pation in the economic and social life of the community.1 46 Consider
the case of Evelyn Smith, a devout Christian widow who is trying to
raise her children on the rental income generated by two duplexes
she owns in Chico, California.1 47 Smith refused to rent to an unmar-
ried couple who wished to cohabit in one of her apartments because
she "believes that sex outside of marriage is sinful, and that it is a sin
for her to rent.., to people who will engage in nonmarital sex on her
property.'1 48 The California Supreme Court held that the state fair
housing laws protected unmarried cohabitants from discrimination
and that Mrs. Smith was not entitled to a religious freedom
exemption.1 49
A full and complete analysis of Smith is beyond the scope of this
Article. I wish to focus on only one significant thread of the case: the
court's refusal to recognize that Smith's religion was "substantially
burdened" by the coercive impact of a law requiring her to do what
her religious conscious condemned as a sin.150 The court held that
Smith's religious freedom was not substantially burdened because she
143 See Duncan, supra note 66.
144 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
145 Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Andrew Koppelman agrees
that gay rights laws "implicitly tell those whose religious beliefs sanction such discrimi-
nation that their religious beliefs are false and that they ought to change them." AN-
DREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SociAL EQUALITY 152 (1996)
146 See Duncan & Young, supra note 9, at 126.
147 See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (1996).
148 Id. at 703.
149 Id. at 705-22.
150 Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, government may not "substan-
tially burden a person's exercise of religion" without a compelling justification. 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). Thus, the "substantial burden" standard is the threshold
for protection of religious freedom under the Act.
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had the option of "selling her units and redeploying the capital in
other investments."' 15 The fact that rental income from her duplexes
was the "major source of income" for Mrs. Smith, a widow, and her
children apparently was irrelevant.152
In other words, when people of faith choose to engage in com-
mercial activities in California they waive their right to religious free-
dom. If the state's restrictive commercial laws conflict with the
exercise of religion, believers are free to go out of business or move to
a more tolerant state. 'We're here. We want to shack up on your
property. And if you can't get used to it, get out of business, you reli-
gious bigot!" That was the lesson Mrs. Smith learned when she asked
the California Supreme Court to protect her religious freedom
against restrictive laws codifying the values of the sexual revolution.,
The "legal and dignity interests" of unmarried cohabitants were too
important to yield, even a little, to the demands of God on Mrs.
Smith's business ethics.' 53 The world has indeed turned upside down,
and good has become evil and evil good. 54
I supported Amendment 2 because I understood the stigmatizing
effect of gay rights laws on persons who cling steadfastly to traditional
notions of sexual morality in post-modern America. The sexual
revolution has wreaked havoc on the quality of life in our society. It
has infected our corporate health, polluted the popular culture, and
damaged the lives of countless children and families.
Individual liberty and religious freedom are also beginning to
turn up on the casualty list. When the state codifies the sexual revolu-
tion and treats human sexuality as a protected civil rights category, it
slanders traditional morality and constrains individual liberty and
freedom of conscience. I believe the people of Colorado understood
this when they voted for Amendment 2. Thus, they were motivated
not by irrational animus, but by the spirit of liberty and tolerance.
151 Smith, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716. Interestingly, the court stated that the "proposi-
tion that a burden on religion is not substantial if one can avoid it" by going out of
business is not "a generally applicable test for identifying substantial burdens." I&
Apparently, it is a special rule that applies in special cases such as when the court
wishes to advance the "dignity interests" of unmarried cohabitants. Id.
152 i. at 737 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
153 Id. at 716.
154 Isaiah's prophetic wisdom has never been more timely: "Woe to those who call
evil good, and good evil; Who put darkness for light, and light for darkness; Who put
bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter!" Isaiah 5:20.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It bears repeating that the Supreme Court's decision in Romer is
of trivial doctrinal import. The Court did not recognize homosexuals
as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, nor did it reverse or undermine its
landmark decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. Moreover, the narrow hold-
ing of Romer suggests quite strongly that typical laws disadvantaging
homosexuals-the military exclusion, the heterosexual paradigm of
civil marriage, and perhaps even better-crafted and more narrow ver-
sions of Amendment 2-do not offend the Equal Protection Clause.
These laws rationally advance legitimate government interests and
should easily pass scrutiny under the rational basis test applied by the
majority in Romer.
However, the majority and dissenting opinions in Romer are sig-
nificant in one respect-they tell clashing and fascinating stories
about the culture war that is currently raging in our pluralistic and
disunited society. Justice Kennedy paints a surrealistic picture of Col-
orado as the hate state. This is the narrative of homosexual funda-
mentalism, and it is the one that is currently dominant among
America's progressive elites. Justice Scalia's story of the Kulturkampf
is more trenchant. Scalia understands that Amendment 2 was an at-
tempt by "tolerant Coloradans" to prevent civil rights laws from being
used to legitimize homosexual conduct and delegitimize traditional
notions of sexual morality. Kennedy's fundamentalism blinded him
to the social reality that the citizens of Colorado had many rational
and legitimate reasons for supporting a constitutional amendment
designed to invalidate laws which conflate the values of the sexual
revolution with those of the civil rights movement. Scalia understood
these complexities of modem America; and for all the public criticism
his opinion has received from the Templar class in society, it rings
true.
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